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Abstract
Faith, Scholarship, and postmodernism
Postmodernism represents perhaps the most important philosophical shift 
occurring in Western thought since the Enlightenment. It is thus crucial fo r  
Christian scholars to address the issues it raises. In the United States, 
Christian scholars have employed at least two different paradigms in 
discussing the relationship o f  faith and scholarship. In the integration 
model, scholars assume that faith and scholarship are two distinct entities 
that must be brought together, while the worldview model assumes that the 
scholar always begins with a narrative worldview that subsequently informs 
one's scholarship. However, the worldview model holds that one's world­
view can be influenced and informed by one's scholarship, life experiences, 
and cultural settings as well. After distinguishing between various kinds o f  
postmodernism based upon their views o f  truth, unknowability, and 
cultural relativism -  this article argues that worldview thinking may benefit 
from the academy’s embrace o f  postmodernism. Although Christian 
scholars have expressed a wide variety o f  opinions on postmodernism, I  
argue that postmodernism’s anti-foundationalism and recognition o f  the 
importance o f  perspectival thinking provide new opportunities fo r  Christian 
scholarship.
1. Introduction
Discussing the relationships among faith, scholarship, and postmodernism is a 
daunting task, but an extremely important one, since postmodernism embodies 
perhaps the most important philosophical shift occurring in W estern thought since 
the Enlightenment. Hence, it is crucial for Christian scholars to think carefully 
about the issues it raises. In this article, I will attempt to outline some of the 
terms in which these issues have recently been discussed in the American 
academy, and some o f my own reflections upon those discussions. After 
sketching two common models or paradigms used to discuss the relationship o f 
faith and scholarship, I will discuss some o f  the disputes within the Christian 
academy over postmodernism. My hope is that these reflections will prove useful 
for South African Christian academics in their own attempts to relate faith, 
scholarship, and their discipline.
Koers 62(2) 1997:149-162 149
Faith, scholarship and postmodernism
Approximately ninety colleges and universities in the United States are affiliated 
with the Coalition o f  Christian Colleges and Universities (CCCU), which, among 
other activities, lobbies the American federal government on behalf o f  Christian 
colleges, coordinates several off-campus study programs both in the US and 
overseas, and sponsors a variety o f activities encouraging academics to consider 
the relationship o f faith and scholarship. These institutions have identified them­
selves as “Christian” in terms o f having an institutional commitment to the 
centrality o f Jesus Christ to all campus life, practising integration o f  biblical faith 
with academics and student life, and requiring a personal Christian commitment 
from each full-time faculty member and administrator. I am a daughter o f the 
Coalition: I earned my B.A. at one member institution; during my career, I have 
taught at three other member institutions; I have lectured at countless others; and 
I am the co-author o f a textbook in a series the Coalition sponsors: Literature 
Through the Eyes o f  Faith (Gallagher & Lundin, 1989). An often-repeated 
phrase at Coalition schools refers to “the integration o f faith and scholarship”, 
and the idea o f  integration, with, in the American context, its unfortunate 
resonances o f racial separation, has been one o f the primary paradigms used to 
relate Christianity and scholarship during the past twenty-five years.
2. The integration model
In order to integrate, something must be separated, and the integration model 
operates on the assumption that faith and scholarship are two distinct entities that 
somehow must be brought together. Faith consists o f  one realm o f knowledge 
and practice -  personal religious commitment, an intellectual grasp o f a particular 
theology, and communal practices o f liturgy and fellowship. Scholarship is a 
separate realm, a professionalised practice devoted to the discovery, propagation, 
and theorising o f  different areas o f knowledge -  whether those be scientific, 
aesthetic, social, or -  even -  religious (which in today’s secular academy is 
usually seen more in anthropological or historical terms). Scholarship is 
conducted according to certain rules o f  the game, which can differ among 
disciplines: anecdotal evidence, for example, is viewed quite differently in the 
natural sciences and the humanities. In order to enter the academy o f scholars, 
one simply learns these rules o f the game: how to collect evidence, how to 
evaluate it, how to theorise about it. It makes no difference if you are female or 
male, black or white, Christian or Hindu. Yale philosopher Nicholas W olterstorff 
has an effective image to describe this procedure:
Before entering the halls of learning we are to strip off all our 
particularities, particularities of gender, o f race, of nationality, o f religion, 
of social class, o f age, and enter purely as human beings. If it turns out that 
we have failed to strip off some particularity and the others in the hall of 
learning notice this, they are to order us back into the entry, there to remove 
the particularity which, unintentionally or not, we kept on. [In this view]
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black history, feminist sociology, Muslim political theory, and liberation 
theology are bad  history, bad  sociology, bad  political theory, bad  theology.
In the practice o f learning we are to make use only o f such belief-forming 
dispositions as are shared among all human beings, and we are to accept 
only the deliverances o f such shared human dispositions (Wolterstorff, 
1993:8).
But when we leave the hall o f learning, or come down from the ivory tower, to 
employ an alternative educational cliché, we are welcome to add on our Christian 
faith to the learning that has taken place.
Integration attempts a less schizophrenic lifestyle, trying to combine the two 
distinct realms in some kind o f complementary fashion. Some Christian scholars 
have chosen to integrate in a personal way: by being truthful, loving, and 
forgiving, by demonstrating Christian civility and charity in their practice of 
scholarship and teaching. Others have employed the discoveries o f their 
particular discipline in such a way as to advance the kingdom: someone who 
engages in communication studies, for example, intending to become a pastor or 
missionary, and recognising that the insights o f this discipline need expansion and 
elaboration by the addition o f  a missing Christian dimension. A good example of 
this kind o f approach is Psychology Through the Eyes o f  Faith (Myers & Jeeves, 
1987), another volume in the Coalition’s “Supplementary Textbook” series. 
Alternatively, a scholar’s Christian commitment might prompt her or him to study 
certain areas: the role o f the church in colonization, or the use o f Christian 
symbols in modem art, or -  has been argued recently -  Shakespeare’s 
commentary on Martin Luther in Hamlet. In this model, there are points at which 
the two areas touch, possibly even overlap a little, but there are also vast spaces 
in which the two operate independently.
The integration model has significant historical origins. Christianity and learning 
were not always considered distinct and separate realms; after all, the beginning 
o f the European university system lies directly in the medieval church. The 
distinction evolved only with the onset o f the modem period, in which faith, the 
supernatural, tradition, and authority fell into disrepute with the rise o f rationality 
and technology. Max W eber (1963) locates the onset o f modernity in two related 
phenomena: first, in the emergence of what he called differentiated spheres, and 
second, in the increasingly pervasive practice o f rationalised thought and action 
within these spheres. The differentiated spheres were either social spheres -  
economy, state, and household, or cultural spheres: science, art, law and ethics. 
The process o f rationalisation, W eber believed, would eventually result in a fully 
“disenchanted” view o f the world, in which religion and the supernatural would 
play no role. The differentiated spheres, no longer held together by any kind of 
religious metanarrative, would be entirely distinct and autonomous -  so that in the 
economic sphere an ethic o f brotherly (and sisterly) love is not relevant, just as in
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the artistic sphere, economic theories play no role. W eber thus provides one 
account o f the secularization o f  society by the establishment o f distinct “ spheres” 
in which faith is either completely rejected, or relegated to its own isolated and 
definitely less important sphere. With such a paradigm, integration becomes 
necessary.
3. The w orldview  model
While in and o f  themselves many specific examples o f integration are admirable 
endeavours, I prefer to employ a different paradigm for the relationship o f  faith 
and scholarship -  what I will call the worldview paradigm. This paradigm has 
been embraced by American Christian academics working out o f many different 
theological traditions, and is the common paradigm that you would find 
employed, for example, in many books published in the US by Inter-Varsity 
Press, such as those by Arthur Holmes (1983a and 1983b) and James Sire (1976). 
However, this way o f thinking has primarily been developed by Reformed 
Christian philosophers and thinkers, following in the illustrious path o f Abraham 
Kuyper. In some American discussions, worldviews are treated as intellectual 
systems o f thought closely related to, if not synonymous with propositional 
theology. Brian J. Walsh, a senior member of the Institute for Christian Studies 
(ICS) in Toronto, however, argues that worldviews are pre-theoretical in nature; 
they are a more general “view, outlook, perspective on life and the world that 
characterizes a people or a culture” (Walsh, 1992:16). Similarly, in an essay 
called “On W orldviews”, James Olthuis, also from the ICS, describes a 
worldview as “a framework or set o f  fundamental beliefs through which we view 
the world and our calling and future in it” (Olthuis, 1985:155). These 
fundamental beliefs are articulated not in propositions but in a story, a myth, 
which provides us with an understanding o f our own role in human history -  who 
we are and why we are here. Worldviews, Walsh elaborates, are visions o f  life 
as well as visions fo r  life, what is and what ought to be, both descriptive and 
normative. A worldview gives rise to, prompts, and informs the culture-building 
activities o f human beings. Finally, worldviews are religious in character:
They are frameworks o f beliefs but these beliefs are not theoretical in 
character. Such beliefs cannot be argued to on the basis o f either inductive 
or deductive reasoning -  rather they are the very foundation o f such 
arguments. Worldview beliefs are more likely argued from than argued to 
(Walsh, 1992:19).
In The Transforming Vision: Shaping a Christian Worldview, Walsh and J. 
Richard Middleton (1984) list four kinds o f questions that they consider 
worldview questions, questions that guide all human culture formation:
•  Where am I, or what is the nature o f the reality in which I find myself?
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•  Who am I, or what is human nature? How do human beings relate to each 
other, to the natural world, and to the divine?
•  What is wrong with the world?
•  What is the remedy? W hat gives us strength and hope?
The answers to these questions are ultimately determined by one’s faith stance: 
one’s relationship to the Creator/Redeemer God, the Scriptures, and the church.
One last point about worldviews: their relationship with culture and faith goes in 
both directions; it is reciprocal. Scholarship can affect, even change, a world­
view, and such a change might mean change in the faith as well. For example, a 
complex cultural conglomerate -  political theory, social reality, moral 
commitment, and scholarly arguments -  worked together, along with the Holy 
Spirit, to change the worldview long held by certain portions o f the Christian 
church that slavery was scripturally endorsed. Throughout the beginning o f  the 
nineteenth century, American theologians from both the north and the south 
conducted an acrimonious debate concerning the Christian view o f  slavery. 
Today, the Christian church agrees that the practice o f  slavery is a violation of 
God’s will for humanity, but we sometimes forget what a radical change in 
worldview this necessitated, as well as some significant adjustments to Christian 
faith. A similar reciprocal process can occur with respect to faith and 
scholarship. In Reason within the Bounds o f  Religion, W olterstorff (1976) 
suggests that in the process o f scholarship, we work with data, theory, and what 
he called “control beliefs,” beliefs that control what data and what theories we 
accept. He writes, “The Christian scholar ought to allow the belief-content o f his 
authentic Christian commitment to function as control within his devising and 
weighing o f theories” (Wolterstorff, 1976:72). But W olterstorff also goes on to 
insist that sometimes the right thing to do in response to developments in a 
discipline is to revise one’s view as to what constitutes one’s authentic Christian 
commitment. We do, he reminds us, make mistakes on that score:
[T]he Congregation o f the Inquisition viewed the geocentric theory as 
belonging to authentic commitment. I think they were mistaken, and 
virtually the entire community o f Christians now thinks they were mistaken.
We have all revised our beliefs, though we have by no means all revised 
them at the same point. W hat originally induced the revisions were 
developments in astronomy and physics (Wolterstorff, 1976:90).
When we enter the hall o f learning, then, we do not enter as “nakedly human” but 
are clothed in our faith, our worldview, and our control beliefs, and we come to 
carry on a  dialogue, a conversation. “W hat actually happens when the Christian
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enters the hall o f learning and begins conversing?” Wolterstorff- asks, and then 
explains,
A great many different things happen; we should honor the diversity. 
Sometimes the Christian finds that she agrees with everyone in the room on 
the topic o f conversation. At other times, she finds she disagrees. Some­
times the root o f her disagreement seems to her to lie in her adherence to 
Christianity; sometimes, it does not seem to her to lie in that. Either way, 
she will argue her case and try to bring the others around to her view. She 
will try to offer reasons which attach to what they already believe, or 
provide experiences which will alter their beliefs. She may find she has 
some allies in this. These allies may be Christians. Then again, they may 
not be. She may in fact find that she has Christians in opposition (Wolters- 
torff, 1993:28-29).
Sometimes during the course o f the conversation, our hypothetical scholar might 
change her mind, might reconsider aspects o f her worldview in new lights. 
Conversations, true conversations, not just talking past each other, involve 
listening, and the Christian scholar must be willing to listen. After all, God grants 
gifts o f wisdom and insight to all humanity, not only those who embrace faith.
Walsh (1992) talks about change in slightly different terms. He is concerned with 
worldview crises -  what happens when there is a chasm between one’s faith and 
worldview and the reality o f one’s life. He identifies at least three possible 
responses:
•  Reformation, in which the reality o f life leads an individual or a community to 
a refocusing or a reforming o f their worldview.
•  Conversion, the abandonment o f one worldview for another.
• Entrenchment, a  conservative backlash to the tlireat and a subsequent, 
stubborn hanging on to a tradition, despite the fact that it no longer adequately 
allows one to cope with historical reality (Walsh, 1992:22).
Walsh’s category o f reformation is the kind o f thing that can occur during those 
long conversations in the halls o f learning. Conversions, too, might take place.
Let me make a few summary observations about the worldview paradigm. First, 
scholarship emerging from one’s Christian worldview is not necessarily unique, 
but it is faithful. As W olterstorff (1993:29) says,
The general goal o f  the Christian in the practice o f science and in the 
conversation o f learning is not difference but fidelity: Not scholarship 
different from that o f all non-Christians but scholarship faithful to Scripture 
and to God in Jesus Christ.
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Secondly, it is important that we be open to the possibility o f change originating 
both from the worldview and from the scholarship. Depending on our own 
personal temperaments, we may be more likely to turn toward one direction or 
another: holding blindly to a rigid conception o f our faith in the face o f evidence 
to the contrary; or erratically setting our compass o f  faith by the current direction 
o f  the intellectual weathervane. This leads to my third observation -  because of 
the difficulties o f such negotiations, such issues must be worked out in a Christian 
community, in a dialogue among Christian scholars, in prayer, and in regular 
participation in the life o f the church. That is the value o f organizations like the 
Coalition o f Christian Colleges and Universities, professional conferences such as 
“Christianity and Literature”, and Potchefstroom’s Centre for Faith and 
Scholarship.
4. Christian scholarship and postmodernism
One particularly timely discussion occurring in that great hall o f  learning involves 
the attitude the Christian scholar should have toward the phenomenon of 
postmodernism. Christian scholars across many disciplines have voiced numerous 
opinions. The pages o f Christian Scholars' Review , Faith and Philosophy, 
Faculty Dialogue, and Christianity and Literature over the past ten years have 
been full o f debates on this topic, with contributions from philosophers, 
theologians, biblical scholars, literary critics, and even economists. Responses 
have varied widely, ranging from Gary Percesepe’s enthusiastic embrace o f “the 
unbearable lightness o f being postmodern” (Percesepe, 1990) to Clarence 
W alhout’s dialogical reflections on whether “Derrida can be Christianized” 
(Walhout, 1985), to Roger Lundin’s sharp condemnation o f those Christians who 
have been “beguiled by the blandishments o f deconstruction” (Lundin, 1993:204).
Some o f  these disagreements can be traced to differing assumptions about what 
postmodernism is. Throughout his book, The Culture o f  Interpretation: Christian 
Faith and  the Postmodern World (1993) Lundin equates postmodernism and 
deconstructive criticism, condemning both and aligning himself with figures such 
as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and Alasdair MacIntyre, especially in 
terms o f their respect for tradition. Yet all three o f  these philosophers are 
identified by Roland Hoksbergen in a recent issue o f Christian Scho lars' Review  
as postmodern, because o f  their claims that personal perspectives influence what 
we can know. Hoksbergen also identifies W olterstorff as postmodern. But 
Lundin, again equating deconstruction and postmodernism (which are not 
necessarily the same thing) argues with reference to W olterstorff that only “at 
first glance [does] the deconstructive agenda seem ... similar to the powerful 
contemporary Christian critiques o f modernity and its impasses” (Lundin, 
1993:203). Although I can by no means discuss all the complexities o f these 
issues, let me at least attempt to isolate some o f  the different strands o f  the
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argument. Some disagreements arise from definitional differences; others from 
what I call perspectival differences -  viewing the same thing as either a glass half 
empty or a glass half full; and still others from fundamental differences in 
worldviews.
The word postmodern  can refer to a historical period, a philosophical theory, and 
a kind o f artistic work (in this article, I will only be referring to the first two 
definitions). In one sense, then, we are all postmodern since we live in the 
historical period following the modem era (which apparently ended some time 
after World War II, perhaps in the sixties, definitely by the eighties). Concerning 
philosophical postmodernism, there is fairly wide-spread agreement on at least 
three points:
•  It is a reaction to, or an evolution from, or a stage after modernism (as 
indicated in the very word: part-modern).
•  As such, philosophical postmodernism is critical o f the Enlightenment myth of 
progress that the Golden Age is attainable through human reason and 
technological achievement.
•  Consequently, postmodernism denies the possibility o f reaching certainty on 
the basis o f reason alone.
In The Condition o f  Postm odem ity, David Harvey (1989) explains post­
modernism’s rejection o f philosophical modernism in this way:
Generally perceived as positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic, 
universal modernism has been identified with the belief in linear progress, 
absolute truths, the rational planning o f ideal social orders, and the 
standardization o f  knowledge and production (Harvey, 1989:9).
Postmodern thought, on the other hand, is characterised by “fragmentation, 
indeterminacy, and intense distrust o f all universal or ‘totalizing’ discourses” 
(Harvey, 1989:9). The French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984:xxiv) 
says that postmodernism simply defined is “incredulity toward metanarratives” .
Postmodern philosophy distrusts the Enlightenment’s optimistic confidence in 
reason and is suspicious o f  universal theories that explain the world, preferring to 
rely instead on narratives based on particular viewpoints, or “standpoint 
epistemology” . Postmodernists are especially skeptical o f the claim that pure 
reason will always lead us to the truth. Some o f the most noted anti- 
foundationalist philosophers have been Christians -  philosophers such as 
W olterstorff and Alvin Plantinga, who have argued that it is impossible to form a 
body o f beliefs solely by means of an unsullied reason, because certain control 
beliefs always come into play. Many Christian thinkers agree with W olterstorffs
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assessment that classical foundationalism essentially is dead and that we must 
“learn to live in its absence” (Wolterstorff, 1976:52). However, there are many 
paths that one can take after assuming foundationalism’s demise, and it is here, at 
the crossroads, that the dissension ensues.
4.1 Postmodernism and truth
Perhaps the most basic disagreement concerns how to talk about truth. If we can 
no longer unquestionably rely on reason to lead us to absolute truth, what are our 
options? Some, let us call them hard postmodernists, consequently claim that 
“truth” is always a fabrication emerging only from human desire and 
manifestations o f power. Richard Rorty (1989), for example, wants to talk about 
truth as something that is made rather than found, constructed rather than 
discovered. Values and truths are merely a matter o f personal choice. 
Concentrating on what cannot be had, the half empty glass, this focus on the 
human construction o f truth often leads to a kind o f carefree nihilism. Others, we 
might call them soft postmodernists, do not abandon die search for truth, but 
conduct it provisionally, examining “truths,” as historically conditioned and 
perspectively limited. They concentrate on what we are able to have in place of 
absolute certainty, the half full glass.
Many postmodernists are notoriously difficult to pin down when it comes to their 
view o f truth; they would rather talk about something else, such as discursive 
constructions. Few, when pushed, actually want to abandon the idea completely, 
and few deny the reality o f scientific truth when it comes to taking antibiotics for 
an infection. The reality o f the physical world is not as easily disputed as the 
reality o f  ideas lying behind language. Postmodernists, however, prefer to talk 
about truth only tentatively and to spend their time instead examining specific 
contexts in which a view o f truth emerges. Derrida, for example, argues that the 
cultural roots o f language, the fact that language is always interpretation, means 
that we are not able to speak about truth and reality in any absolute sense, from a 
point outside history. Walhout (1985:19) responds,
Language may be subjective, historical, and culture-bound and at the same 
time have the capacity to speak truthfully about reality. There is no 
necessary contradiction between subjective interpretation and truth: some 
interpretations may in fact be true.
Derrida’s own pronouncements on political issues, such as his condemnation of 
apartheid and his support o f Amnesty International’s campaign for human rights, 
demonstrate his lived belief that interpretations, while subjective, may also be 
true or false; one must take stands, make commitments on the basis o f what 
appears to be the closest stand to the truth.
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There is no question that some contemporary theorists have responded to the 
collapse o f modernism by following Nietzche’s affirmation o f “the playful will for 
the affirming se lf’ (Lundin, 1993:210), which can lead to hedonism and/or 
fascism. But an equally strong inclination among postmodern thinkers is 
corrective in nature, ethical in emphasis, critiquing culture and discourse by 
examining the power o f representation. Barthes may celebrate the almost sexual 
pleasure he achieves by playing with a text unfettered by authority, but Derrida 
attempts to unmask the pervasive kinds o f  oppression he believes are caused by 
metanarratives. In literary studies, we find both playful deconstnictionists and 
ethically concerned unmaskers o f  discursive power.
Some historians, such as John McGowan, suggest that postmodernism consists 
both o f anti-foundationalism and a leftist political commitment. McGowan 
believes that postmodernism “designates[s] a specific form o f  cultural critique 
that is resolutely antifoundationalist ... while also proclaiming itself resolutely 
radical in its commitment to the transformation o f the existing W estern social 
order” (McGowan, 1991 :ix). A common rejoinder to such claims has been to ask 
on what moral grounds can such a transformation be based, if no metanarrative 
exists, no absolute truth? But note the difference between claiming that no  truth 
exists and claiming that our access to absolute truth is limited or even impossible. 
Many postmodernists do claim that truth is completely contingent and 
constructed, but others paradoxically assume that truth is universal and 
unchanging (somewhere -  in the real world, or in the mind o f God), as well as 
contingent and constructed.
4.2 Postmodernism and ambiguity
A second important question, then, is how we are to respond to the limits o f  our 
rational knowledge. What do we make o f  ambiguity, undecidability, paradox, 
intuition? Christians sympathetic to postmodemism’s puzzles are fond o f citing 1 
Corinthians 13:22: “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to 
face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.” 
Lundin (1993: 204-205) argues that using this text in this way confuses 
indeterminacy and mystery:
The indeterminacy promoted in poststructuralism is a very different thing 
from a biblical sense o f mystery. Whereas mystery speaks o f a truth that 
encompasses men and women even as they fail to comprehend it fully, 
indeterminacy has to do with the vertiginous play o f interpretation that has 
given up on truth and seeks its only comfort in the game-playing potential 
o f language.
But not all postmodernists resort to pure play; many are far more interested in 
unmasking the terrors that historically have resulted from an overly confident
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belief that one has seen or grasped absolute truth. John D. Caputo (1990:164) 
identifies himself as embracing “a version o f postmodern hermeneutics which 
does not simply jettison every notion of truth, self, ethics, and ... faith, but rather 
situate[s] these notions within the radical constraints that postmodernism analysis 
bring[s] out” . He continues by pointing out that “religious faith gets to be quite 
dangerous, and even quite bloody ... when it lack[s] undecidability” (Caputo, 
1990:168). (As in the case o f the assassination o f Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, 
whose murderer, a right-wing Israeli law-student, claimed that God instructed him 
to kill Rabin.) Other scholars, such as Robert Detweiler (1989), have found in 
indeterminacy a door to the sacred, or a space for God: a place beyond science, 
reason, and technology for the holy, the sacred, the ineffable.
4.3 Postmodernism and cultural relativity
A third crucial concept involved in postmodernism is cultural relativity. Diogenes 
Allen, in an essay called “Christianity and the Creed o f Postmodernism” (Allen, 
1993), sees the unique emphasis o f postmodernism not as its anti- 
foundationalism, nor its emphasis on interpretation, nor even its rejection of a 
superhuman reality, but rather all those elements plus cultural relativism. He 
claims,
When cultural relativism is added to [these] commonplaces ... we then get 
the phenomenon o f a postmodernist creed. ... It is only when the concepts 
we use in science, literature, and philosophy are said to be wholly 
embedded in culture, along with the obvious fact that cultures differ, that 
we get the heady mixture o f postmodernism (Allen, 1993:119).
For some postmodernists, the importance of cultural embeddedness leads to the 
claim that every cultural idea and practice is just as valid as the next, the only 
difference lies in the amount o f power one has to assert one’s position. But 
Allen’s conclusion that relativism necessarily results when concepts are “wholly 
embedded in culture” is not one with which all Christian thinkers would agree. 
Walhout has argued, persuasively, to my way of thinking, that Christians are 
essentially historical in their creation and in their relationship with God, and, as 
such, human conceptualising is always embedded in history, culture, and society. 
He claims, “moral principles are not transhistorical or static norms for judging 
value. Rather they emerge from history and require historical interpretation” 
(Walhout, 1994:43). Situating morality in historical context does not deny the 
reality o f  God or truth, but does realise that we encounter the ultimate only in the 
particular, the incarnate. Cultural embeddedness is one o f the realities o f the 
God-created world, and within a theological understanding calls not for 
hedonism, nor nihilism, nor assertions of power, but rather conversation. Given 
the provisional nature o f  the truth to which we all have some access, should we
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not continue talking to and with others in order to correct our own mis­
perceptions? Christians and non-Christians alike?
Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) presents a model for this kind o f interaction in 
historical terms in Truth and M ethod. We have, he explains, a certain horizon o f 
historical experience that limits our interpretations or understanding; that horizon 
is always being extended and its understanding is always evolving. The past, 
with its own horizon o f  understanding, remains available to us as a resource to be 
used to compare with present ways o f interpreting experience. Our understanding 
thus progressively unfolds, but it is always guided by the continuity o f historical 
experience. We engage in continual reinterpretation. W hat Gadamer says with 
respect to historical horizons also applies to cultural horizons: positions in­
fluenced by religion, gender, or ethnicity provide horizons against which we 
judge and readjust our perspectives. W olterstorff (1993:35) proposes that 
“occupying certain positions gives one the only likely initial access to certain 
kinds o f truth”, which he calls “particularism o f cognitive access” . That initial 
access endowed by one’s perspective, however, can be communicated to another; 
conversations can take place; as a white, forty-something American woman, I 
can learn from listening to a black, sixty-something African man, like Chinua 
Achebe.
These are a few o f the many questions that emerge when Christian thinkers 
wrestle with the large, baggy monster o f  philosophical postmodernism. I can 
summarise them as follows: if we agree that the Enlightenment reliance on 
reason to reach absolute truth is no longer viable, are we then postmodern? If  we 
accept the demise of classical foundationalism, how do we respond? Do we give 
up on pursuing truth at all? Do we give up on reason entirely? How do we 
understand the importance of perspective and cultural embeddedness? W hat kind 
of authority do we grant to the Christian tradition as represented in the Scriptures, 
the confessions, and the church?
4.4 Postmodernism’s opportunities
Postmodernism’s anti-foundationalism, along with its renewed emphasis on the 
importance o f perspectives, aids the Christian scholar in three crucial ways.
• First, postmodernism may open up an intellectual arena in which Christian 
scholars can more easily speak with the strength o f their convictions. As 
religious historian George Marsden (1994:430) notes in The Soul o f  the 
American University, “Few academics believe ... in neutral objective science 
any more and most would admit that everyone’s intellectual inquiry takes 
place in a framework o f communities that shape prior commitments” . In other 
words, postmodernism, although not in exactly these terms, admits that 
worldviews do exist and do affect scholarship. Marsden argues, “Hence there
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is little reason to exclude a priori all religiously based claims on the grounds 
that they are unscientific” . If it is indeed important to listen to different 
perspectives, Christianity deserves a hearing in the academy, and this is an 
argument we can now make in postmodern terms.
•  Secondly, postmodernism’s focus on the limits o f  reason provides a valuable 
corrective to modernity’s deification o f the human mind. Christians 
acknowledge that the fall has affected all areas o f  human life -  including 
thought and intellect. We also depend on faith, not just reason, to recognise 
the reality o f  such truths as God’s sovereignty, grace, and love. Our starting 
point is not reason but the truths o f the biblical story.
•  Thirdly, postmodernism’s concern with undecidability reminds us o f the 
danger o f  too quickly making up our mind, the dangers o f  rigidity, especially 
in our understanding o f the Christian faith. Postmodernism has helped us to 
see how cultural and historical perspectives can revise our Christian under­
standing. Lesslie Newbigin (1989) who served for nearly forty years as a 
missionary in India, explains that gradually his cross-cultural experience 
prompted him to see how his own Christianity had been “domesticated” by his 
intellectual formation as a twentieth-century Englishman. Similarly, Vincent 
Donovan (1982) experienced a “rediscovery o f Christianity” when he began 
working with the Masai and viewing the biblical story from their perspective.
However, Christians will part with postmodernists who hold that the only reality 
is that constructed by human beings, that all rationality is completely flawed, and 
in the practice o f scholarship, we should merely celebrate ourselves, our will, and 
our pleasures. These theories do not comport with our worldview or our control 
beliefs, for we acknowledge a transcendent God who created a real world and 
entered that world in the form o f a Jewish man. We believe that God gave us 
(among many gifts) the gift o f rationality, which we can and do employ. Reason 
may be reliable in many cases, but it is not our god; it is limited in its capacity to 
produce or discover absolute truth. And finally, we agree that our motivation for 
scholarship is not an Enlightenment drive to control the world, nor a purely 
hedonistic desire to play with the world, nor a nihilistic exercise o f power over 
the world, but rather a biblically informed goal to construct our stories in such a 
way as to love God and love our neighbour as ourselves.
B ibliography
ALLEN, D. 1993. Christianity and the Creed of Postmodernism. Christian Scholar's 
Review, 23(2). 117-126
CAPUTO, J.D. 1990. Hermeneutics and Faith: A Response to Professor Olthuis. Christian 
Scholar’s Review, 23(3): 164-70.
DETWEILER, R. 1989. Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings of Contemporary Fiction. 
San Francisco : Harper & Row.
Koers 62(2) 1997:149-162 161
Faith, scholarship and postmodernism
DONOVAN, V. 1982. Rediscovering Christianity. 2nd ed. Maryknoll, NY : Orbis.
GADAMER, H. 1989. Truth and Method. 2nd rev. ed. Trans. J. Weinsheimer and D.G. 
Marshall New York : Crossroad
GALLAGHER, S.V. & LUNDIN, R. 1989. Literature Through the Eyes o f Faith. San 
Francisco : Harper Collins.
HARVEY, D. 1989. The Condition of Postmodemity. Cambridge, MA : Basil Blackwell.
HOKSBERGEN, R. 1994. Is There a Christian Economics? Some Thoughts in the Light of 
the Rise of Postmodernism. Christian Scholar's Review, 24(2): 126-142.
HOLMES, A. 1983a. Contours of a Worldview. Grand Rapids, M I: Eerdmans.
HOLMES, A. ed  1983b. The Making o f a Christian Mind: A Christian World View and the 
Academic Enterprise. Downers Grove, IL : Inter-Varsity Press.
LUNDIN, R. 1993. The Culture of Interpretation: Christian Faith and the Postmodern 
World. Grand Rapids, M I : Eerdmans.
LYOTARD, J. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. G. 
Bennington and B. Massumi. Minneapolis : Univ. of Minnesota Press.
MARSDEN, G. 1994. The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment 
to Established Nonbelief. New York : Oxford University Press.
McGOWAN, J. 1991. Postmodernism and Its Critics. Ithaca : Cornell University Press.
MYERS, D.G. & JEEVES, M.A. 1987. Psychology Through the Eyes of Faith. New York : 
Harper Collins.
NEWBIGIN, L. 1989. The Gospel in a Pluralist Society. Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.
OLTHUIS. J. 1985. On Worldviews Christian Scholar’s Review, 14(2):26-40.
PERCESEPE, G.J. 1990. The Unbearable Lightness of Being Postmodern. Christian 
Scholar's Review, 20(2): 118-135.
RORTY, R. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press.
SIRE, J. 1976. The Universe Next Door. Downers Grove, IL : Inter-Varsity Press.
WALHOUT, C. 1985. Can Derrida Be Christianized? Christianity & Literature, 34(2): 15­
22.
WALHOUT, C. 1994. The Problem of Moral Criticism in Christian Literary Theory. 
Christian Scholar’s Review, 24(l):26-44.
WALSH, B.J. 1992. Worldviews, Modernity and the Task of Christian College Education 
Faculty Dialogue, 18:13-35.
WALSH, B. J. & MIDDLETON, J. R. 1984. The Transforming Vision: Shaping a Christian 
World View. Downers Grove, IL : Inter-Varsity Press.
WEBER, M. 1963. The Sociology of Religion. Boston : Beacon Press.
WOLTERSTORFF, N. 1976. Reason Within the Bounds of Religion. Grand Rapids : 
Eerdmans.
WOLTERSTORFF, N. 1993. Can Scholarship and Christian Commitment Mix? A New 
Look at the Integration of Knowledge. Universitas forum. Messiah College.
162 Koers 62(2) 1997:149-162
